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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on Portuguese banks’ 
share prices. I employ an event study methodology to assess the behavior of banks’ share prices 
before, and after a credit rating announcement in relation to both the sovereign and the banks 
individually. I find that sovereign credit ratings have a significant impact on banks’ stock market 
returns while individual bank credit ratings seem to have little influence. This is probably due to the 
fact that banks’ credit ratings have been reflecting changes in sovereign ratings rather than any 
idiosyncratic factors of banks’ solvency. Among the rating agencies studied the most predominant is 
Standard & Poor’s. Furthermore, I find that the behavior of banks’ stock returns exhibit a certain 
degree of market inefficiency and anticipation.  
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1. Introduction 
Financial stability risks have increased
1
 substantially over the past two years due to the burst 
of the so-called European sovereign-debt crisis. It all began when doubts about the Greek 
government ability to honor their debts maturing in 2010 made credit rating agencies review the 
rating notation of several countries pressuring government bonds’ yields to increase drastically.  
Ever since some European countries with special focus on those known as peripheral countries – 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy – were thrown to the spotlight of the protracted crisis, which began 
with the late 2000s financial crisis.  
In the aftermath of this first stage of the crisis – predominantly financial - and with the 
economies slowing as a result of tightened credit and decreasing international trade, governments all 
over the world were forced to take on unprecedented fiscal stimulus, expansionary monetary policy 
and tremendous institutional bailouts for those considered “too big to fail”.  
Among the main recipients of those spectacular rescue packages were banks, which were re-
capitalized at a global scale so as to stave off the banking crisis instigated by the international 
financial crisis started in 2007. It worked but only to postpone it as most of the money banks 
received from governments was without delay to the safest place banks could find in the 
pandemonium of the financial crisis – the so-thought haven of government debt.  
As a consequence of the spectacular fiscal efforts, bailouts, and subsequent recession public 
finances across advanced economies suffered a sharp deterioration, raising concerns regarding the 
sovereign risk for those who already had weak debt positions. On top of that, the impossibility of 
euro area countries to use monetary policy engenders amplified difficulties for such countries. 
Acknowledging the weak fiscal position of some euro area countries credit rating agencies started 
                                                          
1 Source: IMF, September 2011 issue of the Global Financial Stability Report 
4 
reviewing the sovereign credit ratings, especially that of peripheral countries. As a result of the 
concerns/downgrades, the financing costs for countries with poor fiscal balances rose immensely 
leaving Greece (May 2010), Ireland (November 2010), and Portugal (May 2011) no choice but 
default or ask for external help in order to meet their financing needs at a reasonable and viable cost. 
In sum, banks are now very much in the same position they were back in 2007/8 only now 
the toxic assets are government bonds instead of mortgage-back securities – nobody really knows 
how much they are worth. With banks facing such difficulties hovers in the air the possibility of a 
credit shrinkage, which would probably trap the forsaken real economy in a downward spiral as 
argued in several studies
2
.  
Given that this is an issue of utmost importance it is imperative to study the impacts that a 
sovereign debt crisis can have first on banks, and consequently on the general economy. In the scope 
of this paper I study solely the impact on banks but the contagion to the main street is certainly a 
problem worthy of further research. Also, because government debt crisis are not common in 
developed countries, the literature studying the importance of credit rating agencies announcements 
on the latter countries is limited, which makes studies on this subject even more significant. This 
paper tries to provide a better understanding on how has the sovereign-debt crisis affected banks, in 
particular Portuguese banks listed on the main Portuguese stock index – PSI20.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents the methodology 
used in this paper as well as the data used and respective sources. Section three starts the empirical 
analysis using a rather more descriptive approach. Sections four and five continue the empirical 
study using a more analytical and sophisticated approach – event study. The relevant results are 
offered in the final of each section. Finally, section six encloses the main conclusions. 
                                                          
2 Notably, Bernanke (1983) in one of his famous studies about the Great Depression argues that the credit squeeze helped 
transforming the severe but not unprecedented downturn of 1929-30 into the most severe recession of the 20th century. 
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2. Methodology 
 With this paper I aspire to assess how banks’ performances are affected by credit rating 
announcements both at a country and bank level. This is an issue that has been affecting the life of all 
European citizens, especially those of the most affected countries such as Portugal and thus I believe 
it is important to study its consequences to the financial industry as it then distresses the non-financial 
ones. Furthermore, while there are several publications studying the impacts of credit rating 
announcements on government bonds’ spreads the literature regarding its impact on banks is limited, 
which makes it an important topic to analyze, especially in the world we live today. 
Beginning with what I call preliminary analysis, I compare the performance of banks with the 
performance of the other industries on the whole. This approach allows for a better understanding on 
how banks have performed in the past few years in comparison with the non-financial part of the 
economy. In addition I study the correlations between sovereign and banks’ credit default swaps. 
Secondly, and in a more technical note I make use of the event study methodology in order to assess 
and quantify those impacts. Also, by employing this workhorse of empirical finance I pretend to 
assess the existence of market efficiency regarding credit rating types of announcements. 
Notwithstanding the helpfulness of the event study tool, it is important to be aware that the use 
of such statistical instrument carries with it a few shortcomings, namely due to the fact that apart 
from the period leading to the first downgrade studied, it’s difficult to find a clean estimation 
window. Nonetheless, I try to make the necessary adjustments to mitigate problems that may arise 
from the likely hindrances.  
The exact detail on how I employed the event study tool is described in its corresponding 
section. 
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2.1 Data & Sources 
The data used so as to perform this study was collected on Datastream and Bloomberg. From 
the first I obtained all the price series of banks, and other indexes used, as well as time-series of credit 
default swaps for both banks and the Portuguese Republic. Then I ought to calculate the return of 
banks’ shares in order to carry out the analysis. From Bloomberg I obtained all the information 
regarding rating news over the period under analysis – from Jan ’09 to Jan ’12. I focus on the long-
term ratings denominated in foreign-currency because these debt issues have extensive rating 
information and tend to be more liquid.  
In total, considering all rating agencies that issue rating opinions
3
 on the analyzed institution 
(The Big Three 
4
and Dominion Bond Rating Service) there were 79 announcements (51 
downgrades and 28 outlook revisions). Detailed information on the nature of such announcements 
can be found in Appendix 1. Additional details on the data used will be provided alongside with the 
extensive explanation of the methods used in their respective sections.  
3. Preliminary Analysis 
To begin the analysis on how sovereign ratings have affected banks I compare the 
performance of the banking industry with that of the non-banking industry from a few months 
before the beginning of the sovereign-debt crisis up until March 2012. For this purpose I consider 
that the crisis started in January 2009 when the sovereign credit rating for Portugal was first 
downgraded. Not by chance, the period leading up to the first downgrade was one of tremendous 
turmoil. That fact might distort what I am trying to assess – that the sovereign debt crisis, 
notwithstanding affecting the economy on the whole affects banks more severely.  
                                                          
3The credit ratings assigned by the several agencies are opinions on the ability of an entity or of a security issue to meet financial 
commitments, such as interest or repayment of principal, on a timely basis. 
4 Name widely used when refering to the three main credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) 
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To do this comparison between banks’ and the rest of the economy I used two series of daily 
data from Datastream – one that aggregates the entire Portuguese banking system (Portugal – DS 
Banks) and other, which encompasses all other industries except banks (Portugal – DS Non-
Financial). Moreover, I compare individually the performance of the four publicly traded Portuguese 
banks against the same non-financial index (henceforth NFI).  
In order to carry out this approach I compute the ratio
5
 between each bank share value to the 
NFI value and set the value for September, 2008 equal to 100%. Despite the simplicity of this 
approach, it is useful to grasp the relative performance of banks relatively to other industries. More 
sophisticated approaches will be developed later on.  
Results (Graph 1) demonstrate clearly that, Portuguese banks’ share prices have 
underperformed greatly the NFI. For instance, the banking industry on the whole presents a ratio of 
25% in March 2012. Individually the best performer during the scrutinized period was Banco 
Espírito Santo (BES) but its ratio against the NFI went from 100% in the beginning of September 
2008 to 33% as of the beginning of March 2012. On the other hand, Banco Comercial Português 
(BCP) was the one having the worst performance – as of March 2012 the ratio was of 16,2%. These 
figures indeed suggest that the sovereign debt crisis has been having a tremendous impact on the 
banks’ share prices in relation to the other industries. BPI and Banif exhibit a ratio of 30% and 22% 
respectively.  
Moreover, one can observe from Graph 1 that following the natural distress caused by the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in the end of 2008 banks recover modestly until concerns about the 
creditworthiness of sovereigns started increasing (second half of ’09). Lately, since late 2011/early 
2012, banks started recovering relatively to the non-financial part of the market, which signals that 
investors are easing the pressure on Portuguese banks (government bonds’ yields) as the so-called 
“programa de ajustamento” seems to be producing good enough results.  
                                                          
5 Ratioi,t=Banki,t Share Value / NFIt value. This approach is borrowed from Paneta et al. (2011) 
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Graph 1 ratio of the banks’ shares prices to the NFI. Daily data; 1 September 2008 = 100. 
Sources: Datastream, author calculations 
 Secondly, I study the correlations between the sovereign and banks’ credit default swaps 
(CDS) with the purpose of seeing if the perceived creditworthiness of banks moves together with 
that of the sovereign. The banks analyzed are BES, BCP, and Caixa Geral de Depósitos. Due to lack 
of information BPI and Banif are not examined.  
In order to carry out this analysis I use the 5-year senior CDS as they are the most liquid 
instrument among all the maturities available and therefore represent more accurately the true 
relationship between sovereign and banks’ CDSs.  
Regarding the analyzed time-span it corresponds to the previous 5 years. The study was made 
by exploiting daily data collected from Datastream. So as to have a reliable continuous series I had to 
combine the CMA Datavision CDS series with Thomson Reuters CDS series as the first ends in 
2010 and the latter begins in 2009.  
As one can observe from the Graph 2, banks’ and sovereign’s credit default swaps have been 
moving quite closely, which indicates a strong relationship between the creditworthiness of the 
sovereign and that of banks. Moreover, it is observable that CDSs started increasing more 
dramatically on the end of 2009, when the sovereign debt crisis was first identified.  
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Graph 2 – 5 year credit default spreads from the Republic of Portugal and Portuguese banks. Source: Datastream 
Calculations on the correlations between sovereign and banks’ CDSs and among banks are 
presented below in Table 1.  The computations show correlations really close to 1. In relation to the 
sovereign, CDS correlations range from 0,94 of BES to 0,97 of CGD. Inter banks CDS correlations 
range from 0,95 (BPI with BES and CGD) to 0,98 between BES and CGD. 
Again, correlation coefficients show evidence of a very strong relationship between the 
creditworthiness of the sovereign and that of banks.  
Table 1 – Correlation between sovereign and banks’ CDSs 
  Portugal BES BCP BPI Caixa GD 
Portugal 1 
    BES 0,94 1 
   BCP 0,95 0,97 1 
  BPI 0,90 0,95 0,96 1 
 
Caixa GD 0,97 0,98 0,97 0,95 1 
Sources: Author calculations based on Datastream. 
 
4. Event Study 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section an event study on the effect of sovereign-debt crisis on banks’ performances is 
carried out.  In order to do so I study the impact of announcements by credit rating agencies on the 
return of banks’ shares. This study considers all credit rating agencies that issue rating opinions on 
0 € 
500 € 
1.000 € 
1.500 € 
2.000 € 
2.500 € 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Portugal 
BES 
BCP 
Caixa GD 
10 
any of the considered institutions – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch and DBRS. Furthermore I 
analyze the impact of both outlook revisions and downgrades separately.  
The implementation of the event study has the advantage of using available financial market 
data. Furthermore, its usefulness lies on the fact that, given rationality in the market place, the effect 
of an event will impact the securities’ prices without delay, which makes the use of event studies an 
important tool in capital market research as a way of testing market efficiency.  
The event study framework has several applications for various fields but especially in the 
world of finance. The most notable are related to announcements of: mergers and acquisitions, 
earnings, issues of new debt or equity or the release of macroeconomic related figures, accounting 
rule changes, or changes in the severity of regulation.   
In this paper I conduct an event study in which the event studied is rather than a corporate 
level announcement, a supra company announcement where all companies are affected at the same 
type –announcements by credit rating agencies. Studying an event that impacts all companies 
simultaneously carries with it some statistical problems that will be addressed later on. Hereafter 
follows a brief literature review on event studies. 
4.1.1 Literature Review 
“There was little evidence on the central issues of corporate finance. Now we are 
overwhelmed with results, mostly from event studies” (Fama, 1991, p.1600) 
The sentence above illustrates well the importance that event study has had in understanding 
the corporate world. Moreover, and even though, event studies have been introduced several 
decades ago, Harrington and Shrider (2007) point out that “over 35 years following its introduction 
by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), the short-horizon event study remains a workhorse of 
empirical finance and corporate finance in particular.”  
11 
Although it is still a prevalent instrument, the concept of such an important tool in finance is 
quite old and can be traced back to the early 1930s but it was not until the late 1960s that the event 
study methodology would see its biggest breakthrough .Firstly, Ray Ball and Philip Brown (1968) 
considered the information content of earnings. Secondly, and most importantly Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen, and Roll (1969) study the effect of stock splits after removing the effects of simultaneous 
dividend increases.  
The academic developments from 1969 onwards are very much related with the 
methodology used by Fama et al. (1969) mainly because the subsequent research basically tried to 
overcome some shortcoming of this early study. The list of issues comprises the following statistical 
shortcomings: often abnormal returns estimators 1) are cross-sectionally correlated, 2) have different 
variances across firms, 3) are not independent across time for a given firm or 4) have greater 
variance during the event period than in surrounding periods. 
Notwithstanding the large list of statistical drawbacks, contributions from several authors 
namely Jaffe and Mandelker (1974), Patell (1976), Beaver (1968); Mikkleson and Partch (1988), 
Mais et al. (1989), Cowan (1991), Karafiath and Spencer (1991), Sweeney (1991), and Salinger 
(1992) have helped circumventing the problems. 
4.2  “Traditional” Event Study Methodology 
After having briefly reviewed the academic developments of the last few decades and the 
several hypotheses one has when performing an event study, I now present the methodology used in 
this study. While the approach followed is closely related to what Fama et al. (1969) suggested, it 
has some modifications with the purpose of correcting statistical problems arising from the fact that 
the event of interest is the same for all analyzed securities. I focus primarily in A. Craig MacKinley 
(1997) and Khotari and Warner (2006) to carry out the analysis. 
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4.2.1 General Steps 
Even if there is no strict methodology to conduct an event study, there is a widely accepted 
flow of analysis. After defining the events of interest, which on the ambit of this paper are the 
announcements by credit rating agencies, one has to decide upon the period over which security 
prices of relevant firms will be examined – this period is known as the event window.  
For the sake of this paper and as stated previously the relevant firms are the Portuguese banks, 
explicitly those listed on the PSI 20. Moreover, the analysis uses a 5-day event window.  
The event window is larger than the event of interest so as to permit the examination of 
periods surrounding the event. For instance, by considering an event window greater than solely the 
day in which the announcement is made, it is possible to study for market efficiency and 
anticipation, as it will be discussed below. 
4.2.2 The Concept of Abnormal Return and Normal Return Models 
The appraisal of the event’s impact entails a measure of the abnormal return. Just like in Fama 
et al. (1969) the abnormal return is defined as the actual ex post difference between the realized 
return of the firm and the “normal return” during the event window.  
The normal return is defined as the expected return without conditioning on the event taking 
place. The abnormal return for firm i and event date t is specified as follows: 
                                                              ,    (1) 
where      ,     , and            are the abnormal, realized, and normal returns respectively while 
   is the conditioning information for the normal return model.  
A variety of normal return models have been proposed. The importance of such model lies on 
the fact that with greater r-squared the greater is the variance reduction and therefore the prediction 
will have more power. However, r-squared is not all, as with the increase of explanatory variables 
goes the increase in estimation error in a way that it’s important to have a model offering a high r-
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squared while being at the same time parsimonious. The most purposeful models suggested in 
previous literature are:  1) mean-adjusted returns, (2) market model, (3) deviation from the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), or (4) deviations from the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT).  
In this paper I use the so-called market model due to its simplicity, parsimoniously and the 
fact that gains arriving from employing multifactor models for event studies are limited (MacKinlay, 
1997). Moreover, the implementation of statistical models such as the market model require the 
assumption that asset returns are independent and identically distributed through time, which while 
being strong assumptions, are empirically reasonable and inference using normal return models tend 
to be robust to deviations from assumptions.  
4.2.3 Market Model 
The market model is a statistical model in which the return of any given security is linked to 
that of a broad market portfolio. As refereed above, the statistical specification of the model is build 
upon the assumption of joint normality of assets returns and is as follows:   
                                                                  (2) 
                                              and              
  ,   (3) & (4) 
where      and      represent the period-t return of bank i and of the market respectively, and      is 
the zero mean disturbance error term.   ,          
  are the parameters of the model. 
4.2.4 Estimation 
Regarding the length of the estimation window, it is usually set to encompass the 120 daily 
observations prior to the event window. The event window is not included in the estimation window 
to avert the event from influencing the normal performance model parameter estimates.  
I use robust methods to estimate the parameters so as to accommodate for the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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4.2.5 Distribution of Abnormal Returns 
Given the model parameters one has then to measure and analyze the abnormal returns. The 
sample of daily abnormal returns is generated as follows: 
                                                   ,    (5) 
where       represent the abnormal returns estimated by using the market model. Under the null 
hypothesis, conditional on the event window market returns, the abnormal returns will be jointly 
normally distributed with a zero conditional mean and conditional variance           as presented 
below: 
                               
  
 
  
   
         
 
  
  ,    (6) 
where    is the average return of the market during the estimation period, and    
  the variance of  
returns during the same period. The second component is due to sampling error and leads to serial 
correlation of abnormal returns. This problem is solved easily as in practice the length of the 
estimation window can be chosen to be large enough so that the second component of the right-hand 
side of (6) goes to zero. In fact, by using an estimation window as explained above its secure to 
ignore it - the variance of the abnormal returns will be solely    
 .  After having estimated the 
abnormal returns and in order to assess the significance of the event it is paramount to make use of 
the distribution of abnormal returns, which under the null hypothesis - that the event has no impact 
on the behavior of returns - is: 
                                                   
         .    (7) 
4.2.6 Aggregation of Abnormal Returns 
Furthermore and in order to accommodate for multiple period event window one has to 
aggregate the abnormal returns observations. The concept used for such aggregation is again the 
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same used by Fama et al. (1969) - the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). For an event window 
going from    to    the sample cumulative abnormal return is the sum of included abnormal returns: 
                  
  
    
.    (8) 
Moreover, and as in the variance of abnormal return in (6), asymptotically (with large enough 
estimation window) the variance of       is defined as: 
            
                       
 .    (9) 
The distribution of the cumulative abnormal return under the null hypothesis is then:  
                           
         .    (10) 
4.2.7 Estimation of the Variance and t-test 
In practice, because      
  is unknown, one must estimate the variance of the abnormal returns. 
The sample variance measure of      
  from the estimation window is a suitable choice. Given the 
distribution of (cumulative) abnormal returns under the null hypothesis, tests on the veracity of the 
latter can be conducted using the following t-ratio: 
           
           
                
 
  
        .   (11) 
The test above allows for studying the effect of the event of interest at an individual basis. In 
order to study the impact at an aggregate level (i.e. banking industry on the whole) banks’ abnormal 
returns must be aggregated cross-sectionally; however, this is not possible as the assumption that the 
abnormal returns are independent across securities does not hold, due to the overlap of event 
windows. With the overlap the implicit assumption that covariances among securities are zero does 
not hold. This is often referred to as clustering.  
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4.2.8 Inferences with Clustering 
There are two ways of handling the overlapping of the event window. One is to use a 
portfolio approach, case in which the security level analysis can be applied directly to the portfolio. 
The other is to analyze the impact at a security level. This second approach is most commonly used 
when there is total clustering and in spite of having little power and poor finite sample properties 
relatively to the first, has the advantage of accommodating for situations where some firms exhibit 
positive abnormal returns and some other negative abnormal returns.  
In the scope of this work I perform both analyses. For that I use the same banking industry 
portfolio as in the preliminary analysis (Portugal – DS Banks). 
4.2.9 Results 
Applying the methodology explained above I study the significance of all announcements 
made by the pertinent rating agencies. Firstly, I estimate the 5-day CARs starting on the day of the 
announcement (8). Secondly, I ought to estimate the variance of the CARs, which is done using (9) 
after estimating the variance of the abnormal returns. Finally, with the 5-day CAR and respective 
standard deviation I apply the t-test (11). The appraisal of the t-test is standard.  
Table 1 below presents a brief summary of the results obtained by employing this so-called 
“traditional” event study methodology. The events are treated individually, and divided into two 
groups - downgrades and outlook revisions – so as to grasp the impact of each set of events
6
. The 
upper part of the table sums up the impacts of sovereign related announcements whereas the inferior 
summarizes the effect of bank related announcements. I present the average CAR across all events 
as well as the percentage of significant events of each set of announcements (e.g. 1/5 means that 1 
out of 5 was significant). For a more comprehensive understanding please refer to Appendix 2 
where the results are presented in an extensive manner, event by event.  
                                                          
6  For example, all the announcements of S&P regarding BES are considered a set of events. 
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Table 2 - Summary of Announcements' Effects 
 
Sovereign Related Announcements 
Bank S&P Fitch Moody's DBRS 
Banking Industry Downgrade Out.Rev Downgrade Out.Rev Downgrade Out.Rev Downgrade Out.Rev 
%Significant Events 1/5 2/4 2/5* 
N
ot applicable
+ 
0/3 0/2 2/2 
N
ot applicable
+ 
Average CAR -0,41% -4,34% -1% -1% 1% -7% 
Banif 
      
%Significant Events 1/5 1/4** 1/5 0/3 0/2 1/2 
Average CAR -2,83% -0,82% -4% -1% 1% -6,04% 
BCP 
      
%Significant Events 2/5 1/4 2/5 1/3 1/2** 1/2 
Average CAR -0,46% -3,94% -3% -2% 1% -6,06% 
BES 
      
%Significant Events 3/5* 3/4 3/5* 0/3 0/2 1/2 
Average CAR -0,68% -6,84% -1% -3% 1% -6,12% 
BPI 
      
%Significant Events 0/5 1/4 1/5** 0/3 0/2 1/2 
Average CAR -2,59% -1,85% 1% -2% 2% -7,80% 
 
Bank Level Announcements 
 
S&P Fitch Moody's DBRS 
 
Downgrade Out.Rev Downgrade Out.Rev Downgrade Out.Rev Downgrade Out.Rev 
BCP 
        %Significant Events 1/4 1/3*** 1/4** 0/1 0/5 2/4** 
NA 
Average CAR 2,19% -5,02% 0,16% 1,19% -0,86% 2,10% 
BES 
        
%Significant Events 2/4* 0/2 
NA 
1/5** 2/4** 1/2 
NA 
Average CAR 3,07% -5,43% -0,80% 5,06% -6,12% 
BPI 
        
%Significant Events 1/4** 0/2 0/4 0/1 1/4** 0/5*** 
NA 
Average CAR -0,19% -4,53% 2,89% 0,15% 1,99% 1,89% 
The threshold for an event to be considered significant is a p-value<10%; *This percentage include cases where the CAR are significantly positive; **Significant 
events arising from this set of events are only positive;*** one of this outlook revision is a positive one; 1/5 (#significant Events)/ (#Total Events). 
Source: Author Calculations               
 From the results presented in table 1 it is observable that sovereign related announcements 
engendered, in general, negative CARs. Particularly, announcements from S&P and DBRS caused 
negative average CARs across all the analyzed securities.  
Also, Fitch’s announcements produced negative average CARs to all securities with the 
exception of BPI. In relation to Moody’s, the results point out a clear division between downgrades 
and outlook revisions with the first producing negative average CARs across the board whereas the 
latter generated positive average CARs, also across the board.  
18 
Breaking the analysis into downgrades and outlook revisions from S&P one observes that 
with exception of Banif and BPI, outlook revisions have had more impact than downgrades 
themselves. In fact, sovereign outlook revisions by S&P are the set of events producing the most 
significant average CARs.  
For instance, the Portuguese banking industry on the whole underperformed the broad 
market, on average, by 4,34% in the 5-days following a sovereign outlook revision against the 
0,41% correspondent to the parallel underperformance after a downgrade. Individually, the most 
affected banks by sovereign outlook revision are BES and BCP, which exhibit an average CAR of -
6,84% and -3,94% respectively, which again implies a huge difference from the CARs produced by 
downgrades (-0,68% and -0,46%).  
On the other hand, for Banif and BPI, downgrades caused more impact than outlook 
revisions; however, the difference between the verified average CARs is not as significant as for the 
cases of BES and BCP.  
Nevertheless the diverse effects experienced by each bank, the above observations seem to 
entail that outlook revision by S&P are taken by the market as truly new information and that 
somehow, markets participants anticipate the downgrade with the outlook revision. In fact, by 
looking at Appendix 1 (chronology of downgrades/outlook revisions since January ’09) it is 
observable that S&P is sort of the leading rating agency in the sense it anticipates the other agencies 
(announcements by other rating agencies come consistently after the analogous one from S&P).  
As a result of the previous and the fact that rating opinions are almost perfectly substitutes it is 
normal that announcements made by S&P create more significant CARs in relation to other rating 
agencies. This is also supported by the portion of significant events engendered by the various rating 
agencies - S&P has the biggest portion of significant events (excluding DBRS). Announcements 
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coming from the newly appointed
7
 DBRS are significant across the board and produced 
considerable negative average CAR, ranging from -6,04% for Banif to -7,80% to BPI. However, as 
the sample of DBRS announcement is really limited (four downgrades/two dates), it is difficult and 
imprudent to draw meaningful conclusions.  
Furthermore, taking into consideration individual announcements it is again detected that 
outlook revisions from S&P caused considerable negative average CARs. However, and because 
usually rating agencies review their rating opinions for all the institutions around the same date 
(Portugal included) it is difficult if not impossible to assess the relative contribution of 
individual/sovereign outlook revision to the negative CARs observed. Regarding individual rating 
announcements from Fitch and Moody’s there is no evidence of them generating systematic 
negative CARs. In relation to the significance of individual announcements I find it to be very low 
and more surprisingly, to cause at times positive and significant CARs. This last observation may be 
due to the market having worst expectations regarding the awaited announcements in comparison to 
what actually happened. (e.g. agency issues an outlook revision when a downgrade was expected)  
From these results there is evidence that markets value more sovereign than individual 
ratings, meaning that market participants seem to acknowledge, at the time of a sovereign related 
announcement, that sooner or later banks will receive the same treatment.  This finding may be 
associated with the fact that banks’ credit rating reviews have been reflecting changes in sovereign 
ratings rather than any idiosyncratic factors regarding banks’ solvency.  
Moreover, I find evidence that S&P is the predominant agency in the sense its 
announcements generate in general, more significant and negative CARs. Particularly, outlook 
revisions from S&P, probably as a result of being fresh information coming to the markets, generate 
the most remarkable negative average CARs.  
                                                          
7 DBRS started issuing rating opinions on BES and Portugal in 2010 
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Furthermore, it seems that, analogously to the relation between sovereign and individual 
ratings, market participants expect other rating agencies to announce something similar to that S&P 
has already announced. This seems to render announcements from rating agencies other than S&P 
rather “useless”.   
4.3 Regression Based Event Study 
Additionally to the traditional event study methodology I also use regression based event 
study methodology to evaluate the impact of credit rating agencies’ announcements on the return of 
banks’ shares. In order to do so, I employ once again the market model to eliminate the effects of 
wide economic factors leaving the portion of return that is due to firm/country specific information. 
Then, by using a set of dummy variables that assume a value of 1 on the day of the downgrade it is 
possible to evaluate the impact of such an event in banks’ performances as measured by their share 
prices movements. To complete the analysis I also include four lags of the dummy variable. The use 
of the five dummy variables is in a sense, the equivalent to have a 5-day event window and permits 
to study for market efficiency. This approach considers the significance of abnormal returns day-by-
day, conversely to the “traditional” event study that solely studies the significance of the cumulative 
returns over the length of the event window. The regression estimated by using this approach is as 
follows: 
                                              
  
    
   ,   (12) 
where      are dummy variables assuming value one on     and zero otherwise (e.g.       
assumes value on the day of the announcement,       on the day after the announcement etc.) and 
     are the correspondent coefficients. All the remaining variables and parameters remain unaltered 
from what is presented in (2). With this approach the coefficients on the dummy variable correspond 
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precisely to the abnormal returns verified in that day. The regression is estimated by using the entire 
sample, from February ‘07 to January ’12. 
 
4.3.1 Testing for anticipation 
The analysis carried out so far aims at analyzing the reaction of banks’ share prices after a 
credit rating announcement is made.  
Analogously, it is unquestionably interesting to assess if the information contained in the 
announcements is somehow observed by the market even before the announcements are made. To 
test for this hypothesis I use the very same framework as above only with a simple adaptation - the 
inclusion of dummy variables that assume value one in the days preceding the announcement.  
For this purpose I use five new dummy variables, one for each of the five days preceding the 
event. These five days are a very small period of time to make such analysis as if the fundamentals 
of a country/bank were to induce a downgrade, they would most likely be noticeable more than five 
days before the actual announcement. However, due to the high frequency of downgrades during the 
period analyzed, using a larger window so as to study for a possible anticipation phenomenon will 
most likely violate the independence required for conducting such a study. 
4.3.2 Results 
Due to the length of the outputs generated by this regression based event study it is impossible 
to present the results here. However, in Table 2 below I try to sum up the results obtained. For a 
more comprehensive understanding please refer to Appendix 3 where the regressions’ outputs are 
presented in an extensive manner.  
The summary is made at three levels: significance (immediate impact), market inefficiency, 
and anticipation. The judgment of the three considered levels is made qualitatively through a very 
simplistic approach – either they are verified (“yes”) or not (“no”). For instance, in relation to the 
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Portuguese banking industry on the whole (All), country level outlook revisions from S&P caused 
significant impact (“yes”); the adjustment of stock prices after the announcement exhibited signs of 
market inefficiency (“yes”); and finally, there were no signs of anticipation to the announcement 
(“no”).  Again, I divide the analysis of into two groups – outlook revisions and downgrades. 
 
Table 3 - Regression Based Event Study - Outlook Revisions 
 
Country Level 
 
S&P Moody's 
 
All BES BCP BPI Banif All BES BCP BPI Banif 
Significance Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No 
Market Inefficiency Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No 
Anticipation No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Bank Level 
Significance 
NA 
Yes No No 
NA NA 
No No Yes 
NA Market Inefficiency No No No No No No 
Anticipation No Yes No No Yes No 
Downgrades 
 
Country Level 
 
S&P Moody's 
 
All BES BCP BPI Banif All BES BCP BPI Banif 
Significance No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market Inefficiency Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Anticipation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 
Fitch DBRS 
Significance No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market Inefficiency No No No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Anticipation No No No No Yes No Yes No No No 
 
Bank Level 
 
BES BCP 
  
BPI 
  
 
S&P Moody's DBRS S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch 
Significance No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No 
Market Inefficiency No Yes No No No No No No No 
Anticipation No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: The classification of the event as significant is due based on the existence of significant negative abnormal returns (significant coefficient of the parameter 
associated with the dummy variable) on the day of the announcement and day after; the classification of market efficiency is due based on the existence of negative 
abnormal returns on the days after the announcement is made; the classification of anticipation is due based on the existence of negative abnormal returns on the days 
preceding the announcement 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
I now comment briefly the results obtained, starting by the upper part of Table 2 – outlook 
revisions. Commencing from the significance of sovereign outlook revisions made by Standard & 
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Poor’s, there is evidence that it indeed produce significant negative abnormal returns to the banking 
industry in general, and to BES and BCP in particular.  
As for market inefficiency I find significant abnormal returns on the days after the 
announcement for all the securities studied except of BPI, which indicate that the market is not 
efficient as it does not adjust entirely on the day in which the announcement is made.  
Regarding the anticipation, I find no significant negative coefficient in the days preceding the 
announcement apart from BES. Concerning country outlook revision made by the rating agency 
Moody’s I find that they are not significant as there is no evidence of significant abnormal returns on 
the days announcements were made. Also, in the days after the announcement no abnormal returns 
are significant. However, interestingly, there is evidence of anticipation in all securities. Such 
anticipation may thus explain the inexistence of abnormal returns in the day the announcement is 
made as the stock prices were already corrected downwards.  
Moreover, taking into account outlook revisions at bank level, I find its immediate effects to 
be practically zero with the exception of BES and BPI, when the announcement comes from 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s respectively. There is no indication of market inefficiency and 
suggestions of anticipation are weak.  
In sum, I find once again evidence that markets value more sovereign than individual ratings. 
An observation that strengthens the hypothesis mentioned before that banks’ credit rating reviews 
have been reflecting changes in sovereign ratings rather than any idiosyncratic factors regarding 
banks’ solvency. 
In relation to lower part of Table 2 concerning downgrades the main findings are the 
following. Firstly, it is observable that downgrades by Standard & Poor’s are not significant across 
the board, the only exception being BES. Instead, they seem to be highly anticipated which might be 
on the root of no significance in the day of the announcement. Secondly, downgrades by Moody’s 
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and DBRS have affected banks’ share prices broadly. For both rating agencies I find the degree of 
anticipation to be low.  
Concerning market efficiency I find that the market adjusted slowly after announcements 
coming from Moody’s whereas DBRS’s announcements do not seem to cause a slow adjustment of 
stock prices the only exception being BPI. Finally, the rating agency Fitch has no impact whatsoever 
with exception of Banif. Regarding bank level downgrade I find that the only significant for BES are 
the announcements by DBRS, which means little as the newly appointed rating agency reviewed 
their credit rating for Portugal and BES simultaneously. Standard & Poor’s affects both BCP and 
BPI and also for both, there is a certain degree of anticipation. Once again, Fitch has no significance 
for both banks to which it issues rating opinions (BCP and BPI). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper assesses to what extend the European debt crisis have affected Portuguese banks. 
Firstly, I have made a comparative analysis between the performance of the banking industry and 
the performance of the broad index excluding the banking sector. Secondly, I have carried an event 
study analysis for the banks listed on the PSI20. The so-called events are supra company 
announcements issued by credit rating agencies, both of rating changes and outlook revisions from 
2009 onwards. I analyzed the impact of announcements made by the relevant rating agencies – 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch and DBRS. 
From the first study I find that indeed, the banking industry has been severely impacted by 
this European sovereign debt crisis. The underperformance of the banking industry in relation to the 
remaining parts of the economy is overwhelming. Moreover, calculations on the correlations 
between sovereign and banks’ CDSs reveal themselves to be really close to 1 indicating a strong 
relationship between the creditworthiness of the sovereign and that of banks.   
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Regarding the key results obtained with the event study they are essentially four-folded. 
Firstly, I find evidence that sovereign ratings are more important to banks’ stock market 
performances than the actual bank level ratings. This finding may be associated with the fact that 
during this period, changes in banks’ credit ratings have been reflecting changes in sovereign 
creditworthiness rather than any idiosyncratic factors of bank’s solvency. Secondly, there is evidence 
that S&P is the predominant agency, seemingly because it generally anticipates its counter-parties in 
announcing analogous credit opinions. Thirdly, I find evidence that the market is not efficient in 
respect to this type of announcements. Finally, there are indications of anticipation to several 
announcements. 
This study studies solely the particular impact that the European sovereign debt crisis has had 
in Portuguese banks. However, further research on the impact of a sovereign debt crisis to advanced 
economies in general is worthy of being carried out. Namely its impacts to the real economy not 
only in the short run but also in the long run. Moreover, I believe it would be interesting to carry out 
future research on the dynamics of banks’ stock market returns after the results of sovereign debt 
auctions are made public. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1 - Ratings Announcements 
  Institution Date Announcement Rating Agency 
1 Portugal 13-01-2009 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
2 Portugal 21-01-2009 Downgrade to A+ Standard & Poor's 
3 BES 06-04-2009 Outlook revision Moody's 
4 BCP 06-04-2009 Outlook revision Moody's 
5 BPI 06-04-2009 Outlook revision Moody's 
6 BCP 30-07-2009 Downgrade to A- Standard & Poor's 
7 BES 16-09-2009 Downgrade to A1 Moody's 
8 BCP 16-09-2009 Downgrade to A1 Moody's 
9 BPI 16-09-2009 Outlook revision* Moody's 
10 Portugal 07-12-2009 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
11 Portugal 24-03-2010 Downgrade to AA- Fitch 
12 BES 27-04-2010 Downgrade to A- Standard & Poor's 
13 BCP 27-04-2010 Downgrade to BBB+ Standard & Poor's 
14 BPI 27-04-2010 Downgrade to A- Standard & Poor's 
15 Portugal 27-04-2010 Downgrade to A- Standard & Poor's 
16 BES 05-05-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
17 BCP 05-05-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
18 BPI 05-05-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
19 Portugal 05-05-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
20 BES 14-07-2010 Downgrade to A2 Moody's 
21 BCP 14-07-2010 Downgrade to A3 Moody's 
22 BPI 14-07-2010 Downgrade to A2 Moody's 
23 Portugal 14-07-2010 Downgrade to A1 Moody's 
24 BCP 21-07-2010 Downgrade to A Fitch 
25 BPI 21-07-2010 Downgrade to A Fitch 
26 BCP 08-11-2010 Downgrade to BBB+ Fitch 
27 BPI 08-11-2010 Downgrade to A- Fitch 
28 Portugal 30-11-2010 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
29 BES 03-12-2010 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
30 BCP 03-12-2010 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
31 BPI 03-12-2010 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
32 BES 09-12-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
33 BCP 09-12-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
34 BPI 09-12-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
35 Portugal 21-12-2010 Outlook revision Moody's 
36 Portugal 23-12-2010 Downgrade to A+ Fitch 
37 BES 15-02-2011 Outlook revision Moody's 
38 BCP 15-02-2011 Outlook revision Moody's 
39 BPI 15-02-2011 Outlook revision Moody's 
40 Portugal 15-03-2011 Downgrade to Baa1 & Outlook revision Moody's 
41 Portugal 24-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB & Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
42 Portugal 24-03-2011 Downgrade to A- & Outlook revision Fitch 
43 BES 28-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB & Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
44 BCP 28-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB- & Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
45 BPI 28-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB & Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
46 Portugal 29-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB- & Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
47 BCP 30-03-2011 Outlook revision Fitch 
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48 BPI 30-03-2011 Outlook revision Fitch 
49 BES 31-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB- Standard & Poor's 
50 BPI 31-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB- Standard & Poor's 
51 Portugal 01-04-2011 Downgrade to BBB- & Outlook revision Fitch 
52 BCP 05-04-2011 Downgrade to BBB- & Outlook revision Fitch 
53 BPI 05-04-2011 Downgrade to BBB- & Outlook revision Fitch 
54 BES 06-04-2011 Downgrade to Baa2 & Outlook revision Moody's 
55 BCP 06-04-2011 Downgrade to Baa3 & Outlook revision Moody's 
56 BPI 06-04-2011 Downgrade to Baa2 & Outlook revision Moody's 
57 BES 25-05-2011 Downgrade to BBBH DBRS 
58 Portugal 25-05-2011 Downgrade to BBBH DBRS 
59 BCP 14-06-2011 Outlook revision* Standard & Poor's 
60 Portugal 05-07-2011 Downgrade to Ba2 Moody's 
61 BES 15-07-2011 Downgrade to Ba1 & Outlook revision Moody's 
62 BCP 15-07-2011 Downgrade to Ba1 & Outlook revision Moody's 
63 BPI 15-07-2011 Downgrade to Baa3 & Outlook revision Moody's 
64 BES 07-10-2011 Downgrade to Ba2 Moody's 
65 BCP 07-10-2011 Downgrade to Ba3 Moody's 
66 BPI 07-10-2011 Downgrade to Ba2 Moody's 
67 BES 20-10-2011 Downgrade to BBB DBRS 
68 Portugal 20-10-2011 Downgrade to BBB DBRS 
69 Portugal 24-11-2011 Downgrade to BB+ Fitch 
70 BCP 25-11-2011 Downgrade to BB+ Fitch 
71 BPI 25-11-2011 Downgrade to BB+ Fitch 
72 Portugal 05-12-2011 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
73 BES 07-12-2011 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
74 BCP 07-12-2011 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
75 BPI 07-12-2011 Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
76 BES 16-12-2011 Downgrade to BB Standard & Poor's 
77 BCP 16-12-2011 Downgrade to BB & Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
78 BPI 16-12-2011 Downgrade to BB+ & Outlook revision Standard & Poor's 
79 Portugal 13-01-2012 Downgrade to BB Standard & Poor's 
Note: * correspond to positive outlook revisions 
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Appendix 2 (part1) - Sovereign Downgrade 
Agency: Standard & Poor's 
    Bank 
Event Banking Industry Banif BCP BES BPI 
13-01-2009 Outlook Revision 
t-test -2,63*** -0,48 2,05*** 2,05*** -0,89 
CAR -8,00% -2,10% -8,37% -9,79% 5,26% 
21-01-2009 Downgrade to A+ 
t-test -0,07 0,70 0,93 -1,01 -1,21 
CAR -0,23% 2,99% 3,89% -4,82% 
-
7,17% 
07-12-2009 Outlook Revision 
t-test -0,32 0,53 -1,34 0,29 -1,04 
CAR -0,57% 2,21% -4,38% 0,71% 2,85% 
27-04-2010 Downgrade to A- 
t-test 0,37 4,10*** -0,62 2,53*** -1,60 
CAR 0,50% -11,40% -1,47% 5,39% 3,58% 
30-11-2010 Outlook Revision 
t-test -2,48*** -0,47 -1,44 2,37*** -1,72* 
CAR -4,66% -2,55% -3,48% -5,87% 3,61% 
24-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB & Outlook Revision 
t-test -2,52*** -0,80 2,43*** -1,74* -1,36 
CAR -5,19% -3,57% -6,25% -5,12% 3,16% 
29-03-2011 Downgrade to BBB- & Outlook Revision 
t-test -1,30 -0,39 -1,79* -1,76* -0,92 
CAR -2,75% -1,67% -4,66% -5,22% 2,14% 
05-12-2011 Outlook Revision 
t-test -0,80 5,27*** 0,07 2,04*** 0,69 
CAR -4,14% 32,76% 0,48% -12,39% 4,31% 
13-01-2012 Downgrade to BB 
t-test 0,92 -0,07 0,77 0,86 0,47 
CAR 5,64% -0,49% 6,17% 6,38% 3,09% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Source: Author Calculations         
 
Appendix 2 (part2) - Sovereign Downgrade 
Agency: DBRS 
Event Banking Industry Banif BCP BES BPI 
25-05-2011   Downgrade to BBBH 
t-test -1,72* 0,45 3,92*** 0,17 -0,48 
CAR -3,90% 1,64% 10,88% 0,52% -1,40% 
20-10-2011   Downgrade to BBB 
t-test -2,59*** 2,53*** -0,26 2,90*** 3,16*** 
CAR -9,38% 13,71% -1,24% 12,77% 14,21% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Source: Author Calculations         
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Appendix 2 (part3) - Sovereign Downgrade 
Agency: Moody's 
    Bank 
Event Banking Industry Banif BCP BES BPI 
05-05-2010   Outlook Revision 
t-test 1,32 1,10 1,89* -0,34 1,32 
CAR 1,95% 3,27% 4,49% -0,83% 3,40% 
14-07-2010   Downgrade to A1 
t-test -0,62 0,54 0,21 -1,09 -0,28 
CAR -1,27% 1,78% 0,56% -3,02% 1,30% 
21-12-2010   Outlook Revision 
t-test 0,51 -0,34 -1,10 1,18 0,17 
CAR 1,01% -1,78% -2,51% 2,96% 0,39% 
15-03-2011   
Downgrade to Baa1 & Outlook 
Revision 
t-test -0,82 -0,2905 -0,35 -0,6957 -1,12 
CAR -1,64% -1,29% -0,89% -1,98% 2,56% 
05-07-2011   Downgrade to Ba2 
t-test -0,36 -0,90 -2,03*** -0,87 -0,70 
CAR -0,83% -3,29% -6,77% -2,56% 2,12% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author Calculations         
 
 
Appendix 2 (part4) - Sovereign Downgrade 
Agency: Fitch 
    Bank 
Event Banking Industry Banif BCP BES BPI 
24-04-2010 Downgrade to AA- 
t-test 2,36*** 3,11*** 0,52 3,63*** 0,14 
CAR 3,14% -8,66% 1,24% 7,72% 0,31% 
23-12-2010 Downgrade to A+ 
t-test 0,23 -0,11 -0,19 0,88 -0,44 
CAR 0,43% -0,59% -0,48% 2,16% -1,02% 
24-03-2011 Downgrade to A- & Outlook Revision 
t-test -2,52*** -0,80 2,43*** -1,74* -1,36 
CAR -5,19% -3,57% -6,25% -5,12% -3,16% 
01-04-2011 Downgrade to BBB- & Outlook Revision 
t-test 1,22 -0,18 1,30 0,40 2,52*** 
CAR 2,59% -0,79% 3,45% 1,21% 6,06% 
24-11-2011 Downgrade to BB+ 
t-test -0,90 -1,33 -1,79* 2,05*** 0,15 
CAR -4,29% -8,13% 12,21% 10,42% 0,85% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Source: Author Calculations         
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Appendix 3 (part1)- Sovereign Outlook Revisions 
  S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's 
VARIABLES banks banks BES BES BCP BCP BPI BPI Banif Banif 
PSI20 1.208*** 1.202*** 1.119*** 1.114*** 1.266*** 1.257*** 1.090*** 1.096*** 0.898*** 0.901*** 
  (0.0419) (0.0426) (0.0510) (0.0522) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0479) (0.0487) (0.0503) (0.0522) 
t-5 0.000372 0.00837* -0.000586 0.0216* -0.00249 0.00127 0.0136 0.0157*** -0.00318 -0.00951 
  (0.00423) (0.00441) (0.00547) (0.0113) (0.00347) (0.00237) (0.0108) (0.00235) (0.00489) (0.0142) 
t-4 -0.0154 0.00551 -0.0221** 0.0146 -0.0126 0.00167 0.00579 0.00572 -0.00286 0.00976*** 
  (0.0130) (0.00385) (0.0101) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.00372) (0.00809) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.00192) 
t-3 -0.00348* -0.0146*** 0.00368 0.0283*** -0.00649 0.00882*** -0.00782 0.0160*** -0.00232 -0.00658 
  (0.00189) (0.00111) (0.00361) (0.000889) (0.00442) (0.00119) (0.00559) (0.00283) (0.00822) (0.00948) 
t-2 0.0172 0.00490*** 0.0393 0.00518** 0.00604** 0.00951*** 0.0175 -0.00311 0.0287*** -0.0151*** 
  (0.0111) (0.00131) (0.0322) (0.00252) (0.00261) (0.00164) (0.0121) (0.00396) (0.00681) (0.00113) 
t-1 0.00397 -0.00204 0.00233 0.00111 0.00434 -0.00290 0.0122 -0.00401 0.0181 -0.0219*** 
  (0.00488) (0.00172) (0.00641) (0.00978) (0.00556) (0.00235) (0.0131) (0.00449) (0.0126) (0.00204) 
t0 -0.00396 0.000377 -0.0281 -0.0127 0.00934 0.00595 -9.35e-05 -0.00158 0.0192 -0.00933 
  (0.00977) (0.00520) (0.0234) (0.00774) (0.00783) (0.00563) (0.00209) (0.00153) (0.0197) (0.00605) 
t+1 -0.0190*** 0.0222 -0.0129** 0.0161*** 0.0214*** 0.0220 -0.00851 0.0326** 0.0145 0.0102 
  (0.00391) (0.0135) (0.00513) (0.00388) (0.00495) (0.0173) (0.0102) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0125) 
t+2 0.00261 0.00920 0.0132 0.00788* -0.00394 0.0154 0.00335 -0.0120* 0.0161 -0.00931 
  (0.00338) (0.00794) (0.00863) (0.00479) (0.00317) (0.0130) (0.00551) (0.00664) (0.0212) (0.0161) 
t+3 -0.0131** -0.00567 -0.0200* -0.000625 -0.00722 -0.00902 -0.00498 -0.00107 0.0275 0.000137 
  (0.00581) (0.00359) (0.0106) (0.00827) (0.00579) (0.00830) (0.0125) (0.00285) (0.0211) (0.00834) 
t+4 -0.00904* -0.000472 -0.0145 -0.00669 -0.0100** 0.00193 -0.00328 0.000388 -0.0119** -0.00505 
  (0.00519) (0.00200) (0.0110) (0.00732) (0.00436) (0.00172) (0.00682) (0.00626) (0.00500) (0.00600) 
Constant 0.000999** 0.00115*** -0.000559 -0.000712 0.00108** -0.00125** 0.00111** -0.00104* 0.00174*** -0.00131** 
  (0.000422) (0.000424) (0.000496) (0.000515) (0.000536) (0.000532) (0.000535) (0.000534) (0.000584) (0.000594) 
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 
R-squared 0.584 0.580 0.467 0.453 0.491 0.489 0.418 0.418 0.292 0.281 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
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Appendix 3 (part2) - Bank Level Outlook Revisions 
  
VARIABLES 
BES BCP BPI 
S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's 
PSI20 1.125*** 1.102*** 1.259*** 1.262*** 1.079*** 1.094*** 
  (0.0511) (0.0503) (0.0499) (0.0498) (0.0478) (0.0485) 
t-5 -0.0280 -0.00245 -0.0234 -0.00774 0.0129 -0.0152 
  (0.0188) (0.00362) (0.0161) (0.00598) (0.0150) (0.0176) 
t-4 0.00326 0.0159** -0.0117* -0.00619 -0.00680 -0.00127 
  (0.00878) (0.00766) (0.00608) (0.00476) (0.0115) (0.00475) 
t-3 0.0676 0.0122 0.00172 -0.0110** 0.0324* 0.00288 
  (0.0576) (0.0150) (0.00218) (0.00470) (0.0187) (0.00718) 
t-2 0.0106 0.0132 0.0140 0.0105*** 0.0315* -0.00386 
  (0.00805) (0.0256) (0.00859) (0.00362) (0.0178) (0.00520) 
t-1 -0.0538 -0.00736 -0.00444 -0.000424 -0.0102** 0.00886 
  (0.0390) (0.00829) (0.00908) (0.0112) (0.00466) (0.00582) 
t0 0.00732*** -0.00735 -0.00372 0.0113*** 0.00826 0.00567 
  (0.00184) (0.0193) (0.00432) (0.00393) (0.0129) (0.00807) 
t+1 0.0122 0.00669 -0.0126 -0.00684 0.00934*** -0.00470 
  (0.0176) (0.0127) (0.00945) (0.00554) (0.00324) (0.00679) 
t+2 -0.0353*** 0.0141** -0.00212 0.0105 0.0233** 0.0148* 
  (0.0133) (0.00652) (0.00951) (0.0127) (0.0100) (0.00871) 
t+3 -0.00106 0.0270 0.00800*** 0.0113 -0.0103 0.00113 
  (0.00612) (0.0166) (0.00222) (0.00943) (0.0106) (0.00860) 
t+4 -0.00326 0.000701 -0.0140 -0.00367 -0.00525 0.00587* 
  (0.0241) (0.00488) (0.0149) (0.00519) (0.0321) (0.00317) 
Constant -0.000624 0.000913* -0.00107** 0.00118** -0.00113** 0.00107** 
  (0.000491) (0.000504) (0.000532) (0.000536) (0.000528) (0.000539) 
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 
R-squared 0.473 0.456 0.491 0.490 0.422 0.418 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Appendix 3 (part3) - Sovereign Downgrades (Part1) 
  Banks BES BCP 
VARIABLES S&P Moody's DBRS Fitch S&P Moody's DBRS Fitch S&P Moody's DBRS Fitch 
PSI20 1.202*** 1.203*** 1.204*** 1.206*** 1.112*** 1.114*** 1.116*** 1.115*** 1.259*** 1.260*** 1.261*** 1.265*** 
  (0.0425) (0.0422) (0.0422) (0.0418) (0.0515) (0.0514) (0.0512) (0.0512) (0.0506) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0497) 
t-5 -0.0104 0.000226 -0.00576 0.00672 -0.00880 0.00564 0.0121*** -0.00318 -0.00639 -0.00576 -0.00304 0.0123* 
  (0.00809) (0.00469) (0.00599) (0.00562) (0.00895) (0.0115) (0.00341) (0.00380) (0.0135) (0.00459) (0.00678) (0.00707) 
t-4 -0.00153 -0.00374 -0.00365 0.00958 -0.00255 -0.00778 -0.0193** -0.00205 -0.00391 -0.00270 0.00531 0.0162 
  (0.00427) (0.00609) (0.00524) (0.0111) (0.00730) (0.00498) (0.00875) (0.00833) (0.00447) (0.00977) (0.0136) (0.0171) 
t-3 0.00905** 0.00205 -0.0153 0.00537 -0.00151 0.0121** -0.0122 -0.00410 -0.0178** -0.00243 -0.0168 0.00997 
  (0.00392) (0.00489) (0.0106) (0.0219) (0.00592) (0.00548) (0.00978) (0.0108) (0.00774) (0.00806) (0.0111) (0.0287) 
t-2 0.00424 0.00854 0.00988* 0.000223 0.00672 0.00884* 0.0116*** -0.00892 -0.000679 0.00981 0.0234*** 0.00377 
  (0.0110) (0.00667) (0.00587) (0.00319) (0.0165) (0.00458) (0.000504) (0.00664) (0.00830) (0.00948) (0.00789) (0.00483) 
t-1 -0.00436 0.00508** -0.00921 0.00173 -0.0120** -0.00270 -0.0246 -0.00114 -0.00226 0.00735*** -0.00133 0.00429 
  (0.00491) (0.00238) (0.0243) (0.00443) (0.00551) (0.00365) (0.0286) (0.00379) (0.00561) (0.00233) (0.0213) (0.00582) 
t0 -0.00566 0.0151*** -0.00881 -0.0128 0.00867** 0.0167*** 0.0246*** -0.00503 0.000250 -0.0140* -0.00148 -0.0171 
  (0.00361) (0.00521) (0.00552) (0.0117) (0.00391) (0.00249) (0.00514) (0.00572) (0.00452) (0.00730) (0.0115) (0.0147) 
t+1 0.00334 -0.000871 0.0191*** -0.00356 0.00530 -0.00340 -0.0187** -0.00518 0.00300 -0.000340 -0.0210** -0.00410 
  (0.00505) (0.00919) (0.00304) (0.00447) (0.0116) (0.00366) (0.00771) (0.00332) (0.00371) (0.0121) (0.00982) (0.00663) 
t+2 0.00359 -0.00169 -0.0179 0.00894*** 0.0104 0.00759 -0.00462 -0.00118 0.000275 -0.00654 -0.0252 -0.00964 
  (0.00792) (0.00339) (0.0125) (0.00313) (0.00990) (0.00622) (0.00283) (0.00372) (0.00799) (0.00417) (0.0203) (0.00634) 
t+3 0.00462 -0.0106** 0.00565 0.00199 0.00184 -0.0134** 0.00826 -0.000969 0.00207 -0.0102* 0.00612 0.00335 
  (0.00689) (0.00433) (0.0154) (0.00853) (0.0101) (0.00547) (0.00940) (0.00957) (0.00643) (0.00551) (0.0195) (0.0110) 
t+4 -0.0101* 0.00911 0.00673 -0.00680 -0.0142** 0.00548 0.0286 0.00101 -0.00706 0.00939 -0.00493 -0.0119 
  (0.00526) (0.00965) (0.0242) (0.0138) (0.00720) (0.0137) (0.0211) (0.0154) (0.00431) (0.00729) (0.0262) (0.0135) 
Constant 0.00103** 0.00108** 0.00104** 0.00110*** -0.000595 -0.000674 -0.000543 -0.000565 0.00109** -0.00115** 0.00116** 0.00124** 
  (0.000425) (0.000426) (0.000419) (0.000415) (0.000514) (0.000518) (0.000511) (0.000519) (0.000536) (0.000535) (0.000526) (0.000519) 
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 
R-squared 0.580 0.580 0.581 0.581 0.452 0.451 0.456 0.449 0.489 0.489 0.491 0.492 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                     
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Appendix 3 (part4) - Sovereign Downgrades 
  
VARIABLES 
BPI Banif 
S&P Moody's DBRS Fitch S&P Moody's DBRS Fitch 
PSI20 1.090*** 1.086*** 1.088*** 1.085*** 0.895*** 0.891*** 0.898*** 0.898*** 
  (0.0486) (0.0480) (0.0479) (0.0481) (0.0509) (0.0508) (0.0505) (0.0509) 
t-5 -0.0114** 0.0150 -0.0111 0.00195 -0.00341 0.0106 0.0137*** 0.00907 
  (0.00532) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.00629) (0.00447) (0.0133) (0.00378) (0.00792) 
t-4 0.00731 -0.00181 0.00957 0.00225 0.00358 -0.00396 0.00920 -0.00191 
  (0.00759) (0.00560) (0.0111) (0.00618) (0.00589) (0.00693) (0.00715) (0.00405) 
t-3 -0.00184 0.00134 -0.0200 0.00134 -0.00705* 0.00502 0.0105 -0.00154 
  (0.00698) (0.00154) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.00382) (0.00938) (0.0247) (0.00452) 
t-2 0.00692 0.00251*** -0.00362 -0.00220 0.000357 0.0110 0.0278*** -0.00626 
  (0.0100) (0.000904) (0.0152) (0.00248) (0.00703) (0.0116) (0.00178) (0.00856) 
t-1 -0.00280 -0.00133 -0.00487 -0.00427 2.43e-05 0.0213*** -0.00608 0.0112*** 
  (0.00658) (0.00362) (0.0203) (0.00589) (0.00776) (0.00309) (0.0102) (0.00293) 
t0 -0.0162 -0.0189*** 0.0108*** -0.0113 -0.0110 -0.0161** 0.00409 -0.00811 
  (0.0128) (0.00302) (0.00128) (0.0134) (0.00795) (0.00626) (0.00675) (0.0110) 
t+1 -0.0119 0.000475 -0.00776 0.00587 -0.00509 0.0117 0.0331*** -0.00736 
  (0.00779) (0.00755) (0.00795) (0.00564) (0.00647) (0.00925) (0.00104) (0.00896) 
t+2 0.00476 -2.08e-05 0.0264*** -0.0142 0.00335 -0.00316 -0.00126 -0.00545 
  (0.00883) (0.00139) (0.00845) (0.0130) (0.00821) (0.00237) (0.0233) (0.00884) 
t+3 0.00280 -0.00854* -0.0193 0.00146 -0.00422 0.00437 -0.0155 -0.0125** 
  (0.00861) (0.00454) (0.0211) (0.00965) (0.00559) (0.00766) (0.0297) (0.00577) 
t+4 -0.00358 0.0134 0.0164 0.0202** -0.0109** -0.0186* 0.0193 -0.00418 
  (0.00336) (0.0126) (0.0197) (0.00905) (0.00452) (0.0106) (0.0323) (0.00818) 
Constant 0.000922* -0.00103* 0.000903* -0.00103* 0.00129** 0.00138** 0.00143** 0.00123** 
  (0.000537) (0.000538) (0.000530) (0.000534) (0.000601) (0.000596) (0.000587) (0.000600) 
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 
R-squared 0.417 0.417 0.419 0.418 0.281 0.284 0.285 0.282 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Appendix 3 (part5) - Bank Level Downgrades 
VARIABLES BES BCP BPI 
S&P Moody's DBRS S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch 
PSI20 1.120*** 1.117*** 1.116*** 1.260*** 1.262*** 1.261*** 1.080*** 1.086*** 1.086*** 
  (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0512) (0.0509) (0.0500) (0.0499) (0.0482) (0.0480) (0.0479) 
t-5 -0.0186 0.000791 0.0121*** 0.00716** 0.00119 0.00841 0.0118 0.0152* 0.000348 
  (0.0122) (0.00683) (0.00341) (0.00363) (0.00773) (0.0196) (0.0110) (0.00879) (0.00708) 
t-4 0.00816*** -0.00632 -0.0193** 0.0141*** -0.00790* 0.0195 0.0136*** -0.00504 0.00997 
  (0.00120) (0.0109) (0.00875) (0.00533) (0.00474) (0.0266) (0.00422) (0.00690) (0.0126) 
t-3 -0.0124 0.00604 -0.0122 -0.0149 -0.00856 -0.000417 -0.0204** 0.00869 -0.00363 
  (0.00922) (0.00836) (0.00978) (0.0105) (0.00893) (0.00630) (0.00993) (0.00910) (0.00523) 
t-2 -0.0163 -0.00593 0.0116*** -0.00799 -0.00101 0.00389 -0.0206 -0.00125 -0.000510 
  (0.0144) (0.00452) (0.000504) (0.00784) (0.00298) (0.00542) (0.0178) (0.00166) (0.00546) 
t-1 0.00686*** -0.00292 -0.0246 -0.000428 -0.00593 -0.0186 0.0144*** -0.00678 -0.0256** 
  (0.00258) (0.00502) (0.0286) (0.00496) (0.00715) (0.0178) (0.00425) (0.00608) (0.0113) 
t0 0.0155 -0.00261 0.0246*** 0.00876 -0.00249 0.000989 -0.00684 0.0114* 0.00941 
  (0.0146) (0.00312) (0.00514) (0.00937) (0.0140) (0.0102) (0.00732) (0.00630) (0.00758) 
t+1 -0.00673 -0.00355 -0.0187** -0.0101* -0.0111 0.00709 -0.0253* 0.0155 0.00804 
  (0.00484) (0.00755) (0.00771) (0.00535) (0.00958) (0.00972) (0.0130) (0.00951) (0.00567) 
t+2 -0.00363 0.00900** -0.00462 0.00216 -0.000413 -0.00422 0.000239 0.000404 -0.000385 
  (0.00508) (0.00386) (0.00283) (0.00350) (0.00421) (0.00523) (0.00810) (0.00728) (0.00758) 
t+3 0.00226 0.00691 0.00826 0.0107 0.00115 0.00263 0.00637 0.00605 0.0164*** 
  (0.0103) (0.00834) (0.00940) (0.00877) (0.0101) (0.0145) (0.00997) (0.00488) (0.00634) 
t+4 0.00610 0.00769 0.0286 -0.00401 0.00945* 0.00571 0.00833 0.00791 0.00291 
  (0.00837) (0.0127) (0.0211) (0.00627) (0.00486) (0.00811) (0.0111) (0.00899) (0.00807) 
Constant -0.000531 -0.000648 -0.000543 0.00110** 0.00112** 0.00132** 0.000887* 0.00122** 0.00110** 
  (0.000514) (0.000521) (0.000511) (0.000537) (0.000537) (0.000517) (0.000530) (0.000540) (0.000535) 
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 
R-squared 0.455 0.450 0.456 0.491 0.489 0.491 0.424 0.419 0.421 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
